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A variety of teams operate within aviation and decisions are made both within
individual teams and with multiteam collaboration as well. As a result, multiple
decision contexts exist and communication issues are ubiquitous. Two different
approaches to decision making are described. The utility of each approach may
vary across situational factors such as time pressure and attentional capacity. This
is the fourth in a five-article series discussing theory and research relating to
teamwork in aviation. This article presents a core piece of the comprehensive
model of teamwork in aviation,
Permeating Teamwork Processes
Four overriding teamwork processes are involved in both of the sequential processes of
teamwork (planning and implementation) and in the development and maintenance of emergent
states. The permeating processes of interpersonal teamwork processes, leadership,
communication and decision-making are necessary to effectively accomplish both collaborative
planning and implementation. In this article we will cover communication and decision making.
Communication
Communication is characterized as a permeating process because it is intertwined with all
the processes and emergent states. Meta-analysis indicated that both the sharing of relevant
information and the openness of communication were related to team performance (MesmerMagnus et al., 2009). Communication provides a mechanism to share individual situation
awareness, impact collective efficacy, serve as a vehicle for planning, or backup behavior,
coordination, and so forth.
Communication is needed to convey relevant information (Waller, 1999), but more
communication may not always be better (e.g., Zijlstra et al., 2012). Consistent patterns are
reported concerning the nature of communication in effective cockpit crews. Communications
about the environment and flight status promote shared situation awareness and are related to
performance (Bowers et al., 1998; Foushee & Manos, 1981). Compared to less effective cockpit
crews, effective ones quickly settled into stable patterns of reciprocal communication (Zijlstra et
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al., 2012). In effective cockpit crews, commands were likely followed by acknowledgements and
questions were likely to be followed by answers (Kanki et al., 2019).
Other communication factors relating to effective flight crew performance include
assertive communications to question decisions and point out problems (Bowers et al., 1998) and
the use of directives (Bowers et al., 1998; Foushee & Manos, 1981). Directives are more likely to
be associated with high performance when they are explicit, provide reasons, and are framed in
terms of shared goals rather than status (Orasanu-Engel & Mosier, 2019, 2010; Mosier &
Fischer, 2015). These studies indicate the importance of clear, assertive, respectful, and proactive
two-way communication among the cockpit crew. Despite this consistent pattern, some evidence
suggests a more task-contingent approach to communication. A simulation study with
experienced pilots found that relatively long dialogues with frequent speaker switches were
associated with high performance under routine conditions, but were negatively related to
performance under difficult, non-routine flight segments (Lei et al., 2016). This may also suggest
that frequent communication is appropriate under routine conditions, but may detract from
effective adaptation, especially under time pressure.
Observation of experienced ATC teams indicated that they tend to use clear, concise,
meaningful, and timely communications and proactively communicate within the team and with
other ATC teams (Malakis et al., 2010). ATC communication problems can lead to altitude and
lateral displacement (course heading) errors that can result in serious air traffic issues (Grayson,
1981). ATC communication problems are most common under two conditions: shift change and
sector handoffs. Both of these conditions involve passing control of aircraft to another controller
team.
Communications between ATC and pilots can be problematic. Although text-based
communication systems are sometimes used, much of the communication between ATC and
pilots is verbal contact via radio. Both accident investigations and incident reports indicate that
errors in communications between ATC and pilots can cause serious safety risks (Billings &
Cheaney, 1981; Kanki, 2019). Another issue is script-based anticipation errors which involve
pilots or controllers hearing what they expect to hear (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 2009).
Communication issues between flight attendants and pilots have been cited as a factor in
aircraft accidents (Chute & Wiener, 1996; Ford, Henderson, & O’Hare, 2013). Communications
to pilots are sometimes less effective because attendants are unaware of proper terminology for
airplane components or the functional significance of issues they observe (Chute & Wiener,
1996). Attendants sometimes notice abnormal conditions (e.g., vibrations, unusual noises, ice on
wings), but fail to report their concerns to pilots (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012).
In aviation maintenance, communication is needed between technicians working on the
same aircraft (either concurrently or across shifts), between technicians and the lead technician,
with other maintenance facilities concerning deferred maintenance, and with other organizational
units. A high number of maintenance errors occur following shift transfer. Shift change errors
tend to involve more critical aircraft systems and are more likely to result in serious
consequences (Endsley & Robertson, 2000). For example, one fatal accident was caused because
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a technician removed stabilizer screws, but did not inform the incoming technician (Flight Safety
Foundation, 1991). Following a flight with mechanical issues, best practice is for the pilots and a
maintenance technician to meet and discuss the issue. When this does not occur, the technician
must use the pilot’s log notes to diagnose the problem. Frequently the log notes provide only a
cursory description of the problem, making accurate diagnosis difficult (Munro et al., 2008).
Decision-Making
Vigilant decision-making. Many decisions are relatively routine and made without
extensive time pressure (e.g., calculating fuel load or planning for potential diversions based on
weather forecasts). In these situations, vigilant decision models may apply (e.g., Forsyth, 2019;
Janis, 1989). These models suggest specific sequential steps such as analysis of the nature of the
problem, generation of multiple alternatives, evaluation of positive and negative consequences of
various alternatives, choice, and implementation. Pilots face varying degrees of time pressure.
Frequently, during the preflight phase (where transition processes occur) there is time for vigilant
processing. But, during some action phases of the flight, particularly during the takeoff and
approach/landing phases, decisions may need to be made quickly (Thomas, 2004).
Naturalistic decision-making. An important component of aviation decision-making is
understanding and managing threats. Decisions are often made in reaction to threats (e.g., severe
weather, mechanical malfunction) or errors made by the crew or other parties. Thomas (2004)
found that threat and error management was a critical component of decision-making across all
phases of flight. Because aviation is often a dynamic environment where decisions have to be
made under time pressure, with incomplete information and competing goals, the naturalistic
decision-making model (NDM) is appropriate for many team decisions (Lipshitz, Klein, Oransu
& Salas, 2015). Expertise plays a strong role in NDM as experts often make decisions by pattern
matching the current situation to past experiences or recognition-primed decision making (Klein,
2008).
When issues arise, there are often regulations, decision rules and standard operating
procedures (SOPs) that apply; in these cases, situation assessment is the critical process. In other
cases, teams may face situations where they need to develop novel solutions to novel problems
(Canas, Antoli, Fajardo, & Salmeron, 2005). Good decision-making under these conditions
requires not only accurate situation awareness and risk assessment, but also metacognitive
processes, shared mental models, and efficient resource management. Team decision making is
also facilitated by an open communication climate and high levels of trust (Oransu-Engel &
Mosier, 2019).
As Salas et al. (2005) noted, the specific ways team concepts manifest are often dependent
on context. In aviation, task contexts vary in many ways. For pilots, initial flight planning
involves transition teamwork processes while in-flight operations represent action processes.
Thus, flight planning and in-flight operations are two distinct phases of flight that provide
different contexts with potential to moderate the relationship between communication, decisionmaking, and leadership with outcome measures (Cahill et al, 2014; Thomas, 2004). Furthermore,
task requirements vary across the in-flight operations phases of takeoff, cruise, and
approach/landing. Likewise, task demands differ between routine and non-routine tasks. Greater
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appreciation of the moderating effects of task conditions is likely to result in a more refined
understanding of emergent states and processes affecting team performance in aviation. It
appears that the most appropriate communication strategies, leader behavior, and decisionmaking approach may be task contingent. Simpler and directive communication may be needed
when non-routine events are experienced while more explanation and solicitation of input may
be appropriate when conditions are routine. Vigilant decision-making may be effective for
important decisions when time is available, but naturalistic decision making seems to be more
appropriate under time pressure. Shared leadership may be appropriate in many situations, but
directive leadership may be more appropriate when time demands are extreme. Thus, the ability
to adapt leadership and team behavior to situational demands is critical.
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